Colombia occupies a unique position in U.S. hemispheric security policy. It is simultaneously the greatest success story of bilateral security cooperation in the Western Hemisphere and, currently, one of its most diplomatically complicated relationships.
The gains made under Plan Colombia, a program that transformed the country from a near-failed state in the early 2000s to a functional democracy with significantly reduced violence, are real and documented. But those gains were built on a specific institutional partnership between the Colombian and U.S. militaries that the Petro administration has systematically distanced itself from.
“Plan Colombia worked not because of money or weapons. It worked because of sustained bilateral trust between military institutions that understood each other’s doctrine, culture, and operational constraints. That trust takes decades to build and can be damaged quickly.”
The Trump administration decertified Colombia as a partner in the war on drugs in September 2025, citing the Petro government’s failure to meet anti-trafficking obligations. Washington revoked Petro’s visa that same month after he participated in pro-Palestinian demonstrations in New York. Personal sanctions followed in October, targeting Petro, his wife, his son, and his Interior Minister. Colombia also moved closer to China’s Belt and Road Initiative during this period. By any measure, the bilateral relationship had reached a structural low point.
On February 3, 2026, Petro traveled to the White House for the first in-person meeting between the two leaders. The tone was unexpectedly cordial. Trump called it “a great honor” and inscribed a copy of The Art of the Deal with the words “You are great.” Petro left with a MAGA cap and described the meeting as positive. But a friendly photo opportunity is not a security strategy. Petro remains on the OFAC sanctions list. No concrete agreements were announced. Colombia’s coca cultivation remains at historically high levels, with U.N. data placing production at approximately 3,000 metric tons in 2024, more than double the figure from 2021, the year before Petro took office.
The ground reality: On the security side, the picture remains deeply concerning. The ELN continues to expand in territories previously under FARC control, exploiting the post-accord vacuum that was never fully filled. Dissident FARC groups operate with relative impunity in border regions. Petro’s strategy of voluntary crop substitution and negotiated peace with armed groups has not translated into measurable reductions in coca production or criminal territorial control.
The institutional knowledge problem: What U.S. policymakers consistently underestimate is that the success of Plan Colombia was not primarily a financial or military achievement. It was an institutional achievement. It required years of direct engagement between Colombian and U.S. military professionals who shared a common doctrinal framework, understood each other’s chain of command culture, and had built operational trust at the practitioner level. That institutional architecture is currently under strain in ways that budget figures and diplomatic communiques do not capture.
The transition factor: Petro leaves office in August 2026 when his four-year term ends. The next Colombian administration will face a security environment shaped by four years of reduced military pressure on illegal armed groups, record coca production, and a partially repaired but still fragile relationship with Washington. How the incoming government rebuilds bilateral security cooperation, and whether the institutional knowledge base required to do so effectively still exists on both sides, will determine Colombia’s trajectory for the rest of the decade.
For U.S. security interests, the Colombia question is not merely bilateral. Colombia is the anchor of any credible hemispheric counter-narcotics strategy. A Colombia estranged from Washington while criminal networks consolidate in its territory is not just a Colombian problem. It is a structural vulnerability for U.S. national security that no amount of maritime strikes in the Caribbean can substitute for.
